Uljana Feest: Concepts and Objects of Research in Cognitive Science
We use scientific concepts to delineate and describe (what we take to be) the relevant objects in a given domain. In this talk, I am particularly interested in one feature of concepts, namely their ability to guide empirical interventions in pursuit of descriptive knowledge about what I call “objects of research,” i.e., the presumed kinds of things our investigative attention is directed at. My focus will be on objects of psychological research, such as memory. I will argue that in this domain, concepts are tools of their own formation. Two questions will be addressed: First, what are features of psychological concepts, such that they can play this role? Second, what is the nature of the psychological subject matter, such that it allows for empirical investigations by means of concepts? With regard to the first question, I will highlight the importance of operational definitions as tying concepts to the possibility of specific epistemic activities. With regard to the second question, I will suggest that objects of psychological research are best understood as clusters of phenomena. I will situate my analysis vis-à-vis recent work about the iterative process of research as well as discussions about scientific kinds.
We use scientific concepts to delineate and describe (what we take to be) the relevant objects in a given domain. In this talk, I am particularly interested in one feature of concepts, namely their ability to guide empirical interventions in pursuit of descriptive knowledge about what I call “objects of research,” i.e., the presumed kinds of things our investigative attention is directed at. My focus will be on objects of psychological research, such as memory. I will argue that in this domain, concepts are tools of their own formation. Two questions will be addressed: First, what are features of psychological concepts, such that they can play this role? Second, what is the nature of the psychological subject matter, such that it allows for empirical investigations by means of concepts? With regard to the first question, I will highlight the importance of operational definitions as tying concepts to the possibility of specific epistemic activities. With regard to the second question, I will suggest that objects of psychological research are best understood as clusters of phenomena. I will situate my analysis vis-à-vis recent work about the iterative process of research as well as discussions about scientific kinds.