Day 1 (Thursday, October 18)
Time |
Topic |
9:30 – 10:00 |
Registration |
10:00 – 10:10 |
Welcome |
10:10 – 11:00 |
Georg Brun (University of Bern): A Reconception of Concept and Conception |
11:00 – 11:30 |
Coffee break |
11:30 – 12:00 |
Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf): Abductive Concept Formation Bayesian Style |
12:05 – 12:35 |
David Černín (University of Ostrava): Historical Concepts and Conceptual Tension |
12:35 – 2:00 |
Lunch |
2:00 – 2:50 |
James Justus (Florida State University): The Ecological Niche: A Case Study in Problematic Conceptual Indeterminacy |
2:55 – 3:25 |
Corinne Bloch-Mullins (Marquette University): Soups, Sparks and Contrast Classes: Stability and Dynamism in the Concept ‘Synapse’ |
3:25 – 4:15 |
Coffee break |
4:15 – 4:45 |
Michele Luchetti (Central European University, Budapest): The Origins of Ohm’s Conceptual Apparatus: Understanding the Role of Measurement and Coordination |
4:50 – 5:40 |
Adam Caulton (University of Oxford): Functional Concepts and Conceptual Relativity |
7:30 |
Day 2 (Friday, October 19)
Time |
Topic |
10:00 – 10:50 |
Sebastian Lutz (University of Uppsala): Measurement Made Boring |
10:50 – 11:20 |
Coffee break |
11:20 – 12:10 |
Jo E. Wolff (King’s College London): Can We Empirically Determine Whether a Concept is Quantitative? |
12:15 – 13:05 |
Elina Vessonen (University of Cambridge): Concept Formation in Psychometrics |
1:05 – 2:15 |
Lunch |
2:15 – 2:45 |
Gianluca Pozzoni (University of Milan): Concept Formation in Political Science |
2:50 – 3:40 |
Charles Djordjevic and Catherine Herfeld (University of Zurich): The Evaluative Aspect of the Concept of Addiction in Economics: The Case of Gary Becker |
3:40 – 4:10 |
Coffee break |
4:10 – 5:00 |
Samuli Reijula (University of Helsinki): Why Aren't We All Addicts? |
Day 3 (Saturday, October 20)
Time |
Topic |
10:00 – 10:50 |
Uljana Feest (Leibniz University of Hannover): Concepts and Objects of Research in Cognitive Science |
10:50 - 11:20 |
Coffee break |
11:20 – 11:50 |
Yafeng Shan (Tel Aviv University): The Formation of the Concept of Dominance |
11:55 – 12:45 |
Hanna Pułaczewska (University of Szczecin): Cognitive Linguistic Approach to Metaphor in Natural Science |
12:45 – 1:15 |
Closing and farewell |
Abstracts
Corinne Bloch-Mullins: Soups, Sparks and Contrast Classes: Stability and Dynamism in the Concept ‘Synapse’
I argue that scientific concepts are formed as ‘forward-looking’: their structure facilitates the later accommodation of newly discovered phenomena. Drawing on Andersen (2000, 2012), I propose that a family resemblance theory of concepts is able to account for their forward-looking nature. Namely, concepts that are formed on the basis of similarity relations, and which are embedded within a nested hierarchy of contrast sets, both facilitate and constrain the accommodation of new phenomena. Accordingly, concepts are taken as dynamic tools in ongoing investigative practice rather than static receptacles of representations. I illustrate my proposal with a discussion of the concept synapse.
I argue that scientific concepts are formed as ‘forward-looking’: their structure facilitates the later accommodation of newly discovered phenomena. Drawing on Andersen (2000, 2012), I propose that a family resemblance theory of concepts is able to account for their forward-looking nature. Namely, concepts that are formed on the basis of similarity relations, and which are embedded within a nested hierarchy of contrast sets, both facilitate and constrain the accommodation of new phenomena. Accordingly, concepts are taken as dynamic tools in ongoing investigative practice rather than static receptacles of representations. I illustrate my proposal with a discussion of the concept synapse.
Georg Brun: A Reconception of Concept and Conception
Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers hotly debate key notions such as inclusion, democracy, and autonomy. This raises challenges: how can we defend alternative accounts of democracy etc. without talking past each other? can there be reasonable disagreement about democracy etc., and if yes, how? A popular strategy uses Rawls’s distinction between concepts and conceptions. We can share the concept of, e.g. justice, but still debate different interpretations of it by proposing principles that constitute different conceptions of justice. Adherence to the conceptual ‘core’ ensures that we mean the same thing by “justice” and that the proposed conceptions are conceptions of justice. I argue that this idea is attractive but ultimately not viable, because it rests on problematic assumptions about how concepts fix meanings. As an alternative, I suggest the method of reflective equilibrium, which replaces the static contrast between a common core and competing conceptions by a dynamic perspective of concept formation. Pre-theoretic language use and commitments provide a common starting point for developing alternative accounts which yield different concepts of, e.g. justice. Reasonable disagreement can result, and talking past each other can be avoided, as long as the resulting accounts can be defended as reasonable developments of the common starting point.
Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers hotly debate key notions such as inclusion, democracy, and autonomy. This raises challenges: how can we defend alternative accounts of democracy etc. without talking past each other? can there be reasonable disagreement about democracy etc., and if yes, how? A popular strategy uses Rawls’s distinction between concepts and conceptions. We can share the concept of, e.g. justice, but still debate different interpretations of it by proposing principles that constitute different conceptions of justice. Adherence to the conceptual ‘core’ ensures that we mean the same thing by “justice” and that the proposed conceptions are conceptions of justice. I argue that this idea is attractive but ultimately not viable, because it rests on problematic assumptions about how concepts fix meanings. As an alternative, I suggest the method of reflective equilibrium, which replaces the static contrast between a common core and competing conceptions by a dynamic perspective of concept formation. Pre-theoretic language use and commitments provide a common starting point for developing alternative accounts which yield different concepts of, e.g. justice. Reasonable disagreement can result, and talking past each other can be avoided, as long as the resulting accounts can be defended as reasonable developments of the common starting point.
Adam Caulton: Functional Concepts and Conceptual Relativity
Many important concepts in physics are functional. An influential account of functional concepts was provided by Carnap’s later work, modified by Lewis, and encapsulated in the method of Ramsey and Carnap sentences. The essence of the account is a move away from the explicit definition of terms to the stipulation that certain sentences containing the terms come out true. These stipulations typically fail to pick out unique extensions for the terms in question. I aim to explore the consequences of this phenomenon for the determination of meanings for individual sentences, and the related problem of theoretical equivalence (whether two theories may be said to be expressing the same facts). In particular, a descendant of Carnap’s account can make sense of the idea that two theories may in some sense be about the same subject matter, even though individual sentences in those theories’ languages may fail to be translatable. In consequence, we can make precise the notion of conceptual relativity, as it applies to apparently rival theories, each of whose central concepts are functional.
Many important concepts in physics are functional. An influential account of functional concepts was provided by Carnap’s later work, modified by Lewis, and encapsulated in the method of Ramsey and Carnap sentences. The essence of the account is a move away from the explicit definition of terms to the stipulation that certain sentences containing the terms come out true. These stipulations typically fail to pick out unique extensions for the terms in question. I aim to explore the consequences of this phenomenon for the determination of meanings for individual sentences, and the related problem of theoretical equivalence (whether two theories may be said to be expressing the same facts). In particular, a descendant of Carnap’s account can make sense of the idea that two theories may in some sense be about the same subject matter, even though individual sentences in those theories’ languages may fail to be translatable. In consequence, we can make precise the notion of conceptual relativity, as it applies to apparently rival theories, each of whose central concepts are functional.
David Černín: Historical Concepts and Conceptual Tension
Among other kinds of concepts used systematically in the natural and social sciences, the historical concepts face unique set of challenges. Their formation and utilization is unlike that of other disciplines. They are rooted in empirical data and follow vague conventions employed in their creation. This paper focuses on the legacy of L. J. Goldstein and on his posthumously published book Conceptual Tension. Goldstein outlines his idea of historical concepts as a kind of concepts different from concepts by intuition and concepts by postulation. Paper aims to reconstruct Goldstein’s original intention by contextualizing historical concepts in his philosophy of historiography.
Among other kinds of concepts used systematically in the natural and social sciences, the historical concepts face unique set of challenges. Their formation and utilization is unlike that of other disciplines. They are rooted in empirical data and follow vague conventions employed in their creation. This paper focuses on the legacy of L. J. Goldstein and on his posthumously published book Conceptual Tension. Goldstein outlines his idea of historical concepts as a kind of concepts different from concepts by intuition and concepts by postulation. Paper aims to reconstruct Goldstein’s original intention by contextualizing historical concepts in his philosophy of historiography.
Charles Djordjevic, Catherine Herfeld: The Evaluative Aspect of the Concept of Addiction in Economics: The Case of Gary Becker
In this talk, we explore “thick concepts,” i.e., concepts that have both an evaluative and descriptive aspect, and their relation to economics. To render this project tractable, we focus on the Theory of Rational Addiction proposed by economists Gary Becker et al. (1988, 1996) as a case study. We argue that there is a tension between Becker’s view of economics as being a purely empirical enterprise and the concept of addiction that he ultimately proposes. While Becker acknowledges a tension between the ‘ordinary’ concept of addiction as a thick concept and economics, his attempt to remove the evaluative aspect of that concept fails. Our argument hinges on a reading of Becker as employing the strategy of explication. On this reading, Becker’s project of constructing an explicatum that discards non-epistemic values fails. Finally, some possible ramifications of this failure are discussed.
In this talk, we explore “thick concepts,” i.e., concepts that have both an evaluative and descriptive aspect, and their relation to economics. To render this project tractable, we focus on the Theory of Rational Addiction proposed by economists Gary Becker et al. (1988, 1996) as a case study. We argue that there is a tension between Becker’s view of economics as being a purely empirical enterprise and the concept of addiction that he ultimately proposes. While Becker acknowledges a tension between the ‘ordinary’ concept of addiction as a thick concept and economics, his attempt to remove the evaluative aspect of that concept fails. Our argument hinges on a reading of Becker as employing the strategy of explication. On this reading, Becker’s project of constructing an explicatum that discards non-epistemic values fails. Finally, some possible ramifications of this failure are discussed.
Uljana Feest: Concepts and Objects of Research in Cognitive Science
We use scientific concepts to delineate and describe (what we take to be) the relevant objects in a given domain. In this talk, I am particularly interested in one feature of concepts, namely their ability to guide empirical interventions in pursuit of descriptive knowledge about what I call “objects of research,” i.e., the presumed kinds of things our investigative attention is directed at. My focus will be on objects of psychological research, such as memory. I will argue that in this domain, concepts are tools of their own formation. Two questions will be addressed: First, what are features of psychological concepts, such that they can play this role? Second, what is the nature of the psychological subject matter, such that it allows for empirical investigations by means of concepts? With regard to the first question, I will highlight the importance of operational definitions as tying concepts to the possibility of specific epistemic activities. With regard to the second question, I will suggest that objects of psychological research are best understood as clusters of phenomena. I will situate my analysis vis-à-vis recent work about the iterative process of research as well as discussions about scientific kinds.
We use scientific concepts to delineate and describe (what we take to be) the relevant objects in a given domain. In this talk, I am particularly interested in one feature of concepts, namely their ability to guide empirical interventions in pursuit of descriptive knowledge about what I call “objects of research,” i.e., the presumed kinds of things our investigative attention is directed at. My focus will be on objects of psychological research, such as memory. I will argue that in this domain, concepts are tools of their own formation. Two questions will be addressed: First, what are features of psychological concepts, such that they can play this role? Second, what is the nature of the psychological subject matter, such that it allows for empirical investigations by means of concepts? With regard to the first question, I will highlight the importance of operational definitions as tying concepts to the possibility of specific epistemic activities. With regard to the second question, I will suggest that objects of psychological research are best understood as clusters of phenomena. I will situate my analysis vis-à-vis recent work about the iterative process of research as well as discussions about scientific kinds.
Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter: Abductive Concept Formation Bayesian Style
Schurz (2008) proposed a justification of abducing theoretical concepts on the basis of the Reichenbachian principle of the common cause. In this talk we take up the idea of combining creative abduction with causal principles and model instances of successful creative abduction within a Bayes net framework. We identify necessary conditions for such inferences and investigate their unificatory power. We also sketch several interesting applications of modeling creative abduction Bayesian style. In particular, we discuss use-novel predictions, confirmation, and the problem of underdetermination in the context of abductive inferences.
Schurz (2008) proposed a justification of abducing theoretical concepts on the basis of the Reichenbachian principle of the common cause. In this talk we take up the idea of combining creative abduction with causal principles and model instances of successful creative abduction within a Bayes net framework. We identify necessary conditions for such inferences and investigate their unificatory power. We also sketch several interesting applications of modeling creative abduction Bayesian style. In particular, we discuss use-novel predictions, confirmation, and the problem of underdetermination in the context of abductive inferences.
James Justus: The Ecological Niche: A Case Study in Problematic Conceptual Indeterminacy
Perhaps no concept has been thought more important to ecological theorizing than the niche. Without it––its highly abstract definition by G. E. Hutchinson in particular–– technically sophisticated and well-regarded accounts of character displacement, ecological equivalence, limiting similarity, and others would seemingly never have been developed. The niche is also widely considered the centerpiece of the best candidate for a distinctively ecological law, the competitive exclusion principle. But the incongruous array and imprecise character of proposed definitions of the concept square poorly with its apparent scientific centrality. I argue this definitional diversity and imprecision reflects a problematic conceptual indeterminacy that challenges its putative indispensability in ecology. Recent attempts to integrate disparate definitions into a unified characterization fail to resolve the imprecision or remove the indeterminacy. As a case study these deficiencies provide a specific illustration of the compelling epistemic rationale for precision in Carnap’s explicative philosophical methodology.
Perhaps no concept has been thought more important to ecological theorizing than the niche. Without it––its highly abstract definition by G. E. Hutchinson in particular–– technically sophisticated and well-regarded accounts of character displacement, ecological equivalence, limiting similarity, and others would seemingly never have been developed. The niche is also widely considered the centerpiece of the best candidate for a distinctively ecological law, the competitive exclusion principle. But the incongruous array and imprecise character of proposed definitions of the concept square poorly with its apparent scientific centrality. I argue this definitional diversity and imprecision reflects a problematic conceptual indeterminacy that challenges its putative indispensability in ecology. Recent attempts to integrate disparate definitions into a unified characterization fail to resolve the imprecision or remove the indeterminacy. As a case study these deficiencies provide a specific illustration of the compelling epistemic rationale for precision in Carnap’s explicative philosophical methodology.
Michele Luchetti: The Origins of Ohm’s Conceptual Apparatus: Understanding the Role of Measurement and Coordination
In this paper, I trace the historical development of Ohm’s core electrical concepts to exhibit a novel approach to the problem of coordination between theory and measurement. Ohm’s scientific practice involved several epistemic activities including instrument calibration, data reduction, measuring, experimental testing, and mathematical theorising. Some of the connections between these activities show how certain epistemic components and in particular the concepts of “exciting force”, “resistance”, and “tension”, had to be constituted, and thus integrated, within Ohm’s empirical inquiry, rather than representing ready-made features of the world to be used in his scientific reflection.
In this paper, I trace the historical development of Ohm’s core electrical concepts to exhibit a novel approach to the problem of coordination between theory and measurement. Ohm’s scientific practice involved several epistemic activities including instrument calibration, data reduction, measuring, experimental testing, and mathematical theorising. Some of the connections between these activities show how certain epistemic components and in particular the concepts of “exciting force”, “resistance”, and “tension”, had to be constituted, and thus integrated, within Ohm’s empirical inquiry, rather than representing ready-made features of the world to be used in his scientific reflection.
Sebastian Lutz: Measurement Made Boring
I suggest that standardization of quantities is a pragmatically and vaguely distinguished special case of concept formation and that
measurement is an inference from empirical results about a standardized quantity given some background assumptions (including laws of nature).
The measurement debate is thus but a special case of the debates about concept formation and inference, and the logical empiricists’ positions
on these topics can be immediately applied to it. Their positions provide straightforward solutions to alleged problems of conventionalism
in the philosophy of measurement, for instance the influence of empirical results on standardization, different methods of measuring the
same quantity, improvements of measurements and standardizations, and the roles of theoretical assumptions and of models in standardization
and measurement.
I suggest that standardization of quantities is a pragmatically and vaguely distinguished special case of concept formation and that
measurement is an inference from empirical results about a standardized quantity given some background assumptions (including laws of nature).
The measurement debate is thus but a special case of the debates about concept formation and inference, and the logical empiricists’ positions
on these topics can be immediately applied to it. Their positions provide straightforward solutions to alleged problems of conventionalism
in the philosophy of measurement, for instance the influence of empirical results on standardization, different methods of measuring the
same quantity, improvements of measurements and standardizations, and the roles of theoretical assumptions and of models in standardization
and measurement.
Gianluca Pozzoni: Concept Formation in Political Science
Despite its unparalleled importance in the social science landscape, concept formation in political science remains an exceptionally undertheorized issue. Those who have tried to analyze the role of concepts in political science typically saw them as mirroring concrete differences among different classes of phenomena. This is tantamount to defending the existence of “natural kinds” in political reality. Others have pointed to the fact that political conceptualizations in practice defy sharp divisions among classes of phenomena. I propose that such dilemma can be overcome by regarding political concepts as indicating “cluster-kinds” rather than “natural kinds”.
Despite its unparalleled importance in the social science landscape, concept formation in political science remains an exceptionally undertheorized issue. Those who have tried to analyze the role of concepts in political science typically saw them as mirroring concrete differences among different classes of phenomena. This is tantamount to defending the existence of “natural kinds” in political reality. Others have pointed to the fact that political conceptualizations in practice defy sharp divisions among classes of phenomena. I propose that such dilemma can be overcome by regarding political concepts as indicating “cluster-kinds” rather than “natural kinds”.
Hanna Pułaczewska: Cognitive Linguistic Approach to Metaphor in Natural Science
The interest in metaphor sparked off by the pioneering book by the linguists Lakoff and Johnson in 1980 led to the rejection of viewing
metaphors as matter of linguistic expression, and led to a wide search for conceptual metaphors applied in various domains as vehicles
of extending and transferring concepts from the known to the new. In the philosophy of science, the realization of the metaphor playing an important role in creating scientific models came several years earlier. However, when talking of metaphorical concept formation, the linguist and the philosopher do not mean the same. While the philosophers, and historians, of science discuss novel, creative, imaginative juxtapositions of different domains that help establish new discovery routes, linguists are much more interested in the ubiquity of metaphor as a universal and mundane tool of thought and communication. The linguist’s concept of metaphor starts at nominalization of verbs and adjectives, and includes for example deployment of spatial notions when discussing differences in values of abstract physical parameters. The paper discusses how the low-level, trite sort of metaphorisation permeates the way concepts in physics are formed and discussed.
The interest in metaphor sparked off by the pioneering book by the linguists Lakoff and Johnson in 1980 led to the rejection of viewing
metaphors as matter of linguistic expression, and led to a wide search for conceptual metaphors applied in various domains as vehicles
of extending and transferring concepts from the known to the new. In the philosophy of science, the realization of the metaphor playing an important role in creating scientific models came several years earlier. However, when talking of metaphorical concept formation, the linguist and the philosopher do not mean the same. While the philosophers, and historians, of science discuss novel, creative, imaginative juxtapositions of different domains that help establish new discovery routes, linguists are much more interested in the ubiquity of metaphor as a universal and mundane tool of thought and communication. The linguist’s concept of metaphor starts at nominalization of verbs and adjectives, and includes for example deployment of spatial notions when discussing differences in values of abstract physical parameters. The paper discusses how the low-level, trite sort of metaphorisation permeates the way concepts in physics are formed and discussed.
Samuli Reijula: Why Aren't We All Addicts?
The concept of addiction resides at an interdisciplinary junction of research on (the pathologies of) human decision making. Theories of intertemporal choice, on the one hand, and reinforcement learning theory, on the other, constitute two groundbreaking strands of such research effort, and both promise to provide a unified account for explaining a range of substance and behavioral addictions. However, the two theoretical perspectives originate in highly dissimilar research fields, experimental psychology and computer science, and I suggest that it is unclear how the mechanisms of addiction portrayed by them can be seen as mutually compatible (cf. Ross et al. 2008: Midbrain Mutiny). Nonetheless, I argue that together they provide the social sciences (and our everyday self-understanding) important conceptual resources for developing a novel view of the nature of rational agency and self-regulation.
The concept of addiction resides at an interdisciplinary junction of research on (the pathologies of) human decision making. Theories of intertemporal choice, on the one hand, and reinforcement learning theory, on the other, constitute two groundbreaking strands of such research effort, and both promise to provide a unified account for explaining a range of substance and behavioral addictions. However, the two theoretical perspectives originate in highly dissimilar research fields, experimental psychology and computer science, and I suggest that it is unclear how the mechanisms of addiction portrayed by them can be seen as mutually compatible (cf. Ross et al. 2008: Midbrain Mutiny). Nonetheless, I argue that together they provide the social sciences (and our everyday self-understanding) important conceptual resources for developing a novel view of the nature of rational agency and self-regulation.
Yafeng Shan: The Formation of the Concept of Dominance
This paper aims to examine the nature of concept formation by scrutinising the formation of the concept of dominance in the history of biology. I shall begin with a review of the process of the formation of the concept of dominance from mid-19thcentury to the early 20th century. I shall show that the historical development of the concept of dominance well confirms the recent practice-based accounts of conceptual change (e.g., Andersen and Nersessian 2000; Nersessian 2008; Feest 2010; Boon 2012), in which concepts are understood as tools in scientific practice. I shall further argue that the formation and development of the concept of dominance highlight the practical role of scientific concepts in an intertwined scientific activities, including problem-defining, hypothesisation, and experimentation.
This paper aims to examine the nature of concept formation by scrutinising the formation of the concept of dominance in the history of biology. I shall begin with a review of the process of the formation of the concept of dominance from mid-19thcentury to the early 20th century. I shall show that the historical development of the concept of dominance well confirms the recent practice-based accounts of conceptual change (e.g., Andersen and Nersessian 2000; Nersessian 2008; Feest 2010; Boon 2012), in which concepts are understood as tools in scientific practice. I shall further argue that the formation and development of the concept of dominance highlight the practical role of scientific concepts in an intertwined scientific activities, including problem-defining, hypothesisation, and experimentation.
Elina Vessonen: Concept Formation in Psychometrics
Psychometrics is one of the main approaches to measurement in social sciences. Psychometric measures i) are meant to track unobservable attributes (e.g. intelligence and personality), ii) typically take the form of questionnaires or tests, and iii) are validated in light of statistical tests of properties such as reliability and model-fit. In this paper I evaluate these measures from the perspective of concept formation. I argue that although psychometric measures are typically treated as if they track non-operationally characterized, quantitative concepts, the usual validation process does not ensure that psychometric measures in fact track such concepts. I'll explain why such a mismatch between "concepts-assumed" and "concepts-validated" is problematic, and discuss ways to resolve the mismatch.
Psychometrics is one of the main approaches to measurement in social sciences. Psychometric measures i) are meant to track unobservable attributes (e.g. intelligence and personality), ii) typically take the form of questionnaires or tests, and iii) are validated in light of statistical tests of properties such as reliability and model-fit. In this paper I evaluate these measures from the perspective of concept formation. I argue that although psychometric measures are typically treated as if they track non-operationally characterized, quantitative concepts, the usual validation process does not ensure that psychometric measures in fact track such concepts. I'll explain why such a mismatch between "concepts-assumed" and "concepts-validated" is problematic, and discuss ways to resolve the mismatch.
Jo E. Wolff: Can We Empirically Determine Whether a Concept is Quantitative?
Realists claim that quantities are special kinds of attributes in virtue of having a peculiar structure: they are ratios. When we newly introduce a concept as a quantitative concept, this will only be legitimate if the attribute to which the concept purports to refer is indeed a ratio. Traditionally realists have claimed that this needs to be demonstrated empirically. Against this, conventionalists have argued that ascribing ratio structure to an attribute cannot be established empirically, and must instead be regarded as a matter of convention. In my paper, I address a recent instalment of this debate, which focuses on the alleged difference between physics and the social sciences when it comes to establishing the quantitativeness of concepts. I’m aiming for a moderately realist position that acknowledges that we cannot determine quantitativeness directly, but nonetheless resists the idea that it is purely a matter of convention whether a concept counts as quantitative.
Realists claim that quantities are special kinds of attributes in virtue of having a peculiar structure: they are ratios. When we newly introduce a concept as a quantitative concept, this will only be legitimate if the attribute to which the concept purports to refer is indeed a ratio. Traditionally realists have claimed that this needs to be demonstrated empirically. Against this, conventionalists have argued that ascribing ratio structure to an attribute cannot be established empirically, and must instead be regarded as a matter of convention. In my paper, I address a recent instalment of this debate, which focuses on the alleged difference between physics and the social sciences when it comes to establishing the quantitativeness of concepts. I’m aiming for a moderately realist position that acknowledges that we cannot determine quantitativeness directly, but nonetheless resists the idea that it is purely a matter of convention whether a concept counts as quantitative.
