Adam Caulton: Functional Concepts and Conceptual Relativity
Many important concepts in physics are functional. An influential account of functional concepts was provided by Carnap’s later work, modified by Lewis, and encapsulated in the method of Ramsey and Carnap sentences. The essence of the account is a move away from the explicit definition of terms to the stipulation that certain sentences containing the terms come out true. These stipulations typically fail to pick out unique extensions for the terms in question. I aim to explore the consequences of this phenomenon for the determination of meanings for individual sentences, and the related problem of theoretical equivalence (whether two theories may be said to be expressing the same facts). In particular, a descendant of Carnap’s account can make sense of the idea that two theories may in some sense be about the same subject matter, even though individual sentences in those theories’ languages may fail to be translatable. In consequence, we can make precise the notion of conceptual relativity, as it applies to apparently rival theories, each of whose central concepts are functional.
Many important concepts in physics are functional. An influential account of functional concepts was provided by Carnap’s later work, modified by Lewis, and encapsulated in the method of Ramsey and Carnap sentences. The essence of the account is a move away from the explicit definition of terms to the stipulation that certain sentences containing the terms come out true. These stipulations typically fail to pick out unique extensions for the terms in question. I aim to explore the consequences of this phenomenon for the determination of meanings for individual sentences, and the related problem of theoretical equivalence (whether two theories may be said to be expressing the same facts). In particular, a descendant of Carnap’s account can make sense of the idea that two theories may in some sense be about the same subject matter, even though individual sentences in those theories’ languages may fail to be translatable. In consequence, we can make precise the notion of conceptual relativity, as it applies to apparently rival theories, each of whose central concepts are functional.