Jo E. Wolff: Can We Empirically Determine Whether a Concept is Quantitative?
Realists claim that quantities are special kinds of attributes in virtue of having a peculiar structure: they are ratios. When we newly introduce a concept as a quantitative concept, this will only be legitimate if the attribute to which the concept purports to refer is indeed a ratio. Traditionally realists have claimed that this needs to be demonstrated empirically. Against this, conventionalists have argued that ascribing ratio structure to an attribute cannot be established empirically, and must instead be regarded as a matter of convention. In my paper, I address a recent instalment of this debate, which focuses on the alleged difference between physics and the social sciences when it comes to establishing the quantitativeness of concepts. I’m aiming for a moderately realist position that acknowledges that we cannot determine quantitativeness directly, but nonetheless resists the idea that it is purely a matter of convention whether a concept counts as quantitative.
Realists claim that quantities are special kinds of attributes in virtue of having a peculiar structure: they are ratios. When we newly introduce a concept as a quantitative concept, this will only be legitimate if the attribute to which the concept purports to refer is indeed a ratio. Traditionally realists have claimed that this needs to be demonstrated empirically. Against this, conventionalists have argued that ascribing ratio structure to an attribute cannot be established empirically, and must instead be regarded as a matter of convention. In my paper, I address a recent instalment of this debate, which focuses on the alleged difference between physics and the social sciences when it comes to establishing the quantitativeness of concepts. I’m aiming for a moderately realist position that acknowledges that we cannot determine quantitativeness directly, but nonetheless resists the idea that it is purely a matter of convention whether a concept counts as quantitative.